

# Research Security and Intellectual Property Committee

---

|                             |                                    |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Patrick Schlesinger (Chair) | University of California, Berkeley |
| Alexandra Albinak           | Johns Hopkins University           |
| Cindy Kiel                  | University of California, Davis    |
| Michael Moore               | Northwestern University            |
| Dan Nordquist               | Washington State University        |
| Elizabeth Peloso            | University of Pennsylvania         |
| Jennifer Ponting            | University of Chicago              |
| John Ritter                 | Princeton University               |
| Janna Tom                   | University of California           |
| David Winwood               | Louisiana State University         |
| Kevin Wozniak               | Georgia Institute of Technology    |
| Robert Hardy                | Director, COGR                     |

# NIST Update - iEdison

---

## ▶ Background

- ▶ NIH legacy system
- ▶ NIH: “iEdison makes it easy to learn about the law and its regulations and report an invention or patent funded by any of the agencies listed”

## ▶ Rebuild

- ▶ RFI for redesign of system from ground up at NISH

## ▶ Next steps

- ▶ Received many comments and will form stakeholder groups
- ▶ Webinar in April
- ▶ Award in November 2020
- ▶ Operational system in 2022

# NIST – Bayh-Dole Regulations

---

- ▶ Bayh-Dole at 40
- ▶ Rulemaking
  - ▶ No legislative fixes recommended
  - ▶ More in the nature of “housekeeping” than restructuring
  - ▶ To be sent to OMB in March, NPRM in April
  - ▶ Removing explanatory material from existing regulation

# DOE Order 142.3A

---

- ▶ Unclassified foreign visits and assignments
- ▶ Exemption removed
  - ▶ Applied to research under grants performed at institutions of higher education where results are published
  - ▶ Performance of such research **not** considered “access to DOE sites, information, technology, equipment, programs, or personnel”
- ▶ FN information to be provided for DOE review
- ▶ DOE secretary or designee must approve participation of individuals from T-4 countries
- ▶ DOE HQ vs. DOE contracting officers

# DOD Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (31 Jan 2020)


---

- ▶ Unified cybersecurity standard for future acquisitions

## CMMC Model v1.0: Number of Practices and Processes Introduced at each Level

| CMMC Level | Practices | Processes |
|------------|-----------|-----------|
| Level 1    | 17        | -         |
| Level 2    | 55        | 2         |
| Level 3    | 58        | 1         |
| Level 4    | 26        | 1         |
| Level 5    | 15        | 1         |

# CMMC



# FAR 52.204-21

---

- ▶ **(i)** Limit [information system](#) access to authorized users, processes acting on behalf of authorized users, or devices (including other [information](#) systems).
- ▶ **(ii)** Limit [information system](#) access to the types of transactions and functions that authorized users are permitted to execute.
- ▶ **(iii)** Verify and control/limit connections to and use of external [information](#) systems.
- ▶ **(iv)** Control [information](#) posted or processed on publicly accessible [information](#) systems.
- ▶ **(v)** Identify [information system](#) users, processes acting on behalf of users, or devices.
- ▶ **(vi)** Authenticate (or verify) the identities of those users, processes, or devices, as a prerequisite to allowing access to organizational [information](#) systems.
- ▶ **(vii)** Sanitize or destroy [information system](#) media containing [Federal Contract Information](#) before disposal or release for reuse.
- ▶ **(viii)** Limit physical access to organizational [information](#) systems, [equipment](#), and the respective operating environments to authorized individuals.
- ▶ **(ix)** Escort visitors and monitor visitor activity; maintain audit logs of physical access; and control and manage physical access devices.
- ▶ **(x)** Monitor, control, and protect organizational communications (*i.e.*, [information](#) transmitted or received by organizational [information](#) systems) at the external boundaries and key internal boundaries of the [information](#) systems.
- ▶ **(xi)** Implement subnetworks for publicly accessible system [components](#) that are physically or logically separated from internal networks.
- ▶ **(xii)** Identify, report, and correct [information](#) and [information system](#) flaws in a timely manner.
- ▶ **(xiii)** [Provide](#) protection from malicious code at appropriate locations within organizational [information](#) systems.
- ▶ **(xiv)** Update malicious code protection mechanisms when [new](#) releases are available.
- ▶ **(xv)** Perform periodic scans of the [information system](#) and real-time scans of files from external sources as files are downloaded, opened, or executed.

# CMMC Roll-out

---

- ▶ Applied through 7012 clause
- ▶ Phased approach
  - ▶ Small number of prime contractors - 10 in the first years
  - ▶ But could show up in subaward
- ▶ Third-party audit/certification
- ▶ Costs
  - ▶ DOD: Should be minimal for level 1 ~ \$5K
- ▶ Certify enclave/small number of labs
- ▶ Procedures, Guidance & Information (PGI) document needed for fundamental research?
- ▶ More information
  - ▶ COGR updates
  - ▶ AUECO Conference April 28-29, 2020 – University of Pennsylvania



# Huawei Equipment Restrictions

---

- ▶ NDAA FY19
  - ▶ Manufacturers
    - ▶ Telecommunications – Huawei, ZTE
    - ▶ Telecom in public safety context – Hytera, Hangzhou Hikvision, Dahua
  - ▶ Prohibition on sale of defined equipment to USG (2019)
  - ▶ Prohibition on use of defined equipment by contractor, not in the context of a particular contract (Aug. 2020)
- ▶ “Substantial or essential part” of system
- ▶ Scan networks and replace effected equipment
- ▶ Could have components within larger pieces of equipment