This document provides comprehensive guidance for technology transfer professionals on navigating the complex and evolving landscape of U.S. research security...
Other Science & Security
Understanding the complete research security landscape is essential to ensuring compliance while maintaining an open and collaborative research environment.
Featured
Summary of NSTC Guidance for Implementing National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 Disclosure Requirements
The NSTC Guidance for Implementing National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 (NSPM-33) Disclosure Requirements, Version 2.0 (January 11, 2022), outlines uniform...
Framework for Review of Individual Global Engagements in Academic Research (V.1)
The "Framework for Review of Individual Global Engagements in Academic Research," developed by the Council on Governmental Relations (COGR), serves as a guidance...
Resources
Point of Contact
All Other Science & Security Articles
Comparison Chart: NIH Pre-Award and Post-Award Disclosures Relating to the Biographical Sketch and Other Support
This document compares the June 2022 version of the NIH Pre-award and Post-award Disclosures Relating to the Biographical Sketch and Other Support with the prior version of the chart related by NIH.
Promoting and Protecting the U.S. Science and Engineering Enterprise: March 2022 Meeting
The document addresses the challenges and strategies involved in promoting and protecting the U.S. science and engineering enterprise, with a particular focus on the threats posed by foreign government talent recruitment programs. Such programs, often initiated or funded by foreign states, can undermine the transparency and integrity of U.S. research by incentivizing behaviors that may conflict wi
COGR Submits Comment Letter to OSTP Concerning January 2022 Guidance for Implementing NSPM-33
This letter contains COGR’s comments regarding the Implementation Guidance for National Security Presidential Memorandum 33, and stresses the need for transparency, a risk-based approach, and cross-agency consistency.
Overview of DARPA’s Countering Foreign Influence Program (CFIP) and Senior/Key Personnel Foreign Influence Risk Rubric
Overview of DARPA’s Countering Foreign Influence Program (CFIP) and Senior/Key Personnel Foreign Influence Risk Rubric DARPA officials Wes Bennett, Director, Contracts Management Office and Kevin Flaherty, Assist. Director, Policy; Oversight, Security; Intelligence Directorate will provide an overview of DARPA’s CFIP.
COGR’s Response to JCORE RFI
COGR submitted comprehensive comments to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) regarding the American Research Environment. COGR commended OSTP for its cross-agency efforts to address persistent challenges in research administration, emphasizing that the proliferation of federal regulations and inconsistent agency requirements has increased administrative burdens, potentia
Strengthening the U.S. Research Environment: June 2019 Meeting
The document outlines the priorities and initiatives of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) aimed at strengthening the U.S. research environment. The OSTP's mission is to ensure American leadership in science and technology by fostering discovery and innovation, developing the future workforce, and advancing national values on the global stage. The office plays a ce
Addressing Foreign Threats to U.S. Research and National Security: October Meeting 2018
The document, authored by Rebecca Keiser from the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) Office of International Science and Engineering, addresses the challenges and responses related to protecting U.S. research and national security from foreign threats. Emphasizing the principle outlined in NSDD-189, it underscores the significance of maintaining an open scientific environment where the free excha
NIH Foreign Influence Letter to Grantees
The letter from the Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Francis S. Collins, dated August 20, 2018, addresses growing concerns about the integrity of the U.S. biomedical research enterprise due to inappropriate foreign influences. While acknowledging the longstanding and productive collaboration between the NIH and academic institutions, with contributions from a diverse global com